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Recently, some philosophers of psychiatry (viz., Rachel Cooper and Dominic Murphy) have 
analyzed the issue of psychiatric classification. This paper expands upon these analyses and 
seeks to demonstrate that a consideration of the history of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
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critically examining the issue of psychiatric classification. This case is intended to demonstrate 
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In recent years, some philosophers of science have been interested in questions concerning the 
classification of mental disorders. The aim of this paper is to qualify and expand upon these 
analyses by taking into account relevant aspects of the history of psychiatry. In engaging in such 
a task, I aim to show how a consideration of the history of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (DSM) can provide a rich and expansive perspective for addressing 
philosophical issues concerning psychiatric classification. In this regard, the paper seeks to 
illustrate the important methodological role that history can play in the context of philosophy of 
psychiatry. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. I begin by reviewing the philosophical arguments 
concerning psychiatric classification offered by Rachel Cooper and Dominic Murphy. In 
particular, I review Cooper’s argument that the DSM’s goal of classifying natural kinds is 
unlikely to be achieved in practice because of external pressures on the manual, and Murphy’s 
argument that psychiatry ought to adopt a causal approach to classification. I subsequently 
examine the history of psychiatric classification embedded in the history of the DSM in the latter 
half of the twentieth century in order to show how Cooper’s and Murphy’s arguments can be 
qualified. My examination of history focuses on American psychiatry’s “revolution in 
classification” – associated with the publication of DSM-III in 1980 – in which the DSM moved 
away from a psychoanalytic and etiological approach (characteristic of DSM-I and DSM-II) to 
an “atheoretical” and descriptive approach. I present the historical factors responsible for this 
shift in terms of the crisis that psychoanalytically-oriented psychiatry faced in the 1960s and 
1970s, and the crucial role of the scientifically-oriented “neo-Kraepelinian” task force led by 
Robert Spitzer that was responsible for revising DSM-II. I argue that the history of the DSM 
highlights psychiatry’s distinctive status as an applied and practically-oriented science, and that 
the philosophical analyses of psychiatric classification offered by Cooper and Murphy fail to 
sufficiently appreciate this historical fact. From this standpoint, I offer some qualifications and 
amendments to Cooper’s and Murphy’s arguments. 
 
2. Philosophical Arguments about Psychiatric Classification 
Rachel Cooper and Dominic Murphy have recently offered provocative and interesting 
philosophical arguments concerning psychiatric classification.1 Both Cooper’s and Murphy’s 
arguments are presented with reference to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM), which is the most influential and widely used classification manual in the 
context of contemporary mental health discourse and practices.2 Cooper argues that the DSM’s 
                                                            
1 R. Cooper, Classifying Madness: A Philosophical Examination of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005); D. Murphy, Psychiatry in the Scientific Image (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2006). 
2 The DSM has been published regularly by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) since 1952, and is 
currently in its fourth edition. Six editions of the DSM have been published: (1) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual: 
Mental Disorders (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, 1952); (2) Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, 1968); (3) Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, 1980); (4) 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 3rd ed., Revised (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric 
Association, 1987); (5) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th ed. (Washington, DC: American 
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aim of classifying mental disorders as natural kinds is feasible; however, she suggests that this 
ideal is unlikely to be achieved because of external pressures on the manual. Murphy argues that 
the descriptive approach to classification favored by the DSM since the publication of DSM-III 
should be abandoned in favor of a causal approach to psychiatric classification.     
  
2.1  Cooper on the Limitations of Classifying Natural Kinds  
Cooper’s argument concerns the prospects of classifying mental disorders as natural kinds, and 
she suggests that the likelihood of achieving such a goal is gloomy.3 Cooper maintains that some 
mental disorders are natural kinds insofar as members of a kind share similar key properties (e.g., 
a similar genetic basis) that determine other salient characteristics of the disorder. She suggests 
that the DSM is unlikely to classify disorders as natural kinds because of the way that the manual 
is influenced by social and financial factors (e.g., the medical insurance industry).4 
 Cooper defends a non-essentialist account of natural kinds that stipulates that members of 
a natural kind are objectively similar in theoretically important ways. As she puts it, “members 
of a natural kind all possess similar determining properties, where the determining properties of 
an entity are those properties that determine its other properties”.5 On this account, determining 
properties are the key properties of an entity that render members within a class of entity similar. 
More specifically, determining properties are properties that are of particular interest to 
scientists, and appear in natural laws that support inductive inferences about members of a kind. 
For example, the determining property of Huntington’s Chorea is an anomaly on chromosome 
four, which causes the appearance of its characteristic symptoms (i.e., jerky movements, 
progressive motor dysfunction, cognitive impairments, memory deficits, dementia). In this sense, 
Cooper maintains that mental disorders that are natural kinds possess similar determining 
properties (e.g., a genetic or neurobiological anomaly). From this standpoint, a manual such as 
the DSM could classify mental disorders as natural kinds insofar as psychiatrists could use 
empirical data to identify categories for grouping together classes that possess similar 
determining properties (e.g., grouping together disorders that involve a similar neurotransmitter 
dysfunction). 
 Cooper argues that the DSM’s goal of classifying mental disorders in a naturalistic 
manner is unlikely to be achieved in practice because of various social and financial factors that 
shape and constrain the organization of the DSM. Specifically, she argues that pressures from the 
pharmaceutical and medical insurance industries have functioned to hinder the goal of 
classifying natural kinds. With respect to the pharmaceutical industry, Cooper brings attention to 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Psychiatric Association, 1994); and (6) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th ed., Text 
Revision (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, 2000). For convenience, I refer to the various 
editions of the DSM as DSM-I (1952),  DSM-II (1968), DSM-III (1980), DSM-III-R (1987), DSM-IV (1994), and 
DSM-IV-TR (2000); at the time of writing this paper, DSM-V is in preparation. 
3 See Cooper, Classifying Madness, ch. 4; R. Cooper, “What  is Wrong with the DSM”, History of Psychiatry 15 
(2004), 5—25.  
4 Cooper also argues that the goal of classifying mental disorders as natural kinds is impeded by the theory-
ladenness of classification. See Cooper, Classifying Madness, ch. 3; R. Cooper, Psychiatry and Philosophy of 
Science (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007), ch. 8. In this paper, I focus on her 
arguments concerning social and financial pressures.  
5 Cooper, Classifying Madness, 54. 
4 
 
the way that the DSM has been shaped by the marketing of particular drug treatments.6 For 
instance, some mental disorders (e.g., panic disorder, social phobia) have been substantiated 
through marketing campaigns aimed to show that they can be successfully treated by particular 
drugs. Similarly, she suggests that niche marketing of certain mental disorders (e.g., attention 
deficit hyperactivity disorder) by pharmaceutical companies can function to raise the prominence 
(and prevalence) of a condition, thereby helping to establish its legitimacy as a mental disorder. 
According to Cooper these pressures from the pharmaceutical industry impede the DSM’s aim of 
classifying natural kinds.  
Cooper maintains that the medical insurance industry presents an even stronger 
impediment to classifying mental disorders as natural kinds. The negative influence of this 
industry on classification arises from the role that the DSM plays in medical insurance 
reimbursement. By the late 1960s, medical insurance carriers in the United States required a 
DSM diagnosis for patients to receive reimbursement for mental health treatment.7 According to 
Cooper, this created new pressures on the DSM, leading to new disorders (e.g., post-traumatic 
stress disorder) being included in DSM-III as the result of lobbying for certain groups to receive 
reimbursement for treatment.8 Moreover, insurance considerations have led to modifying 
diagnostic criteria for some disorders (e.g., seasonal affective disorder) in order to allow more 
patients to receive reimbursement for treatment. Cooper also suggests that pressures from the 
medical insurance industry can have more subtle effects on the DSM. For example, if 
psychiatrists routinely interpret certain diagnostic criteria less stringently in clinical practice in 
order to allow patients to receive reimbursement, then these shifts in clinical norms for what 
counts as a disorder could eventually be reflected back into the diagnostic criteria of the DSM. 
 
2.2 Murphy on Causal Classification 
Murphy’s argument concerns the overarching approach to psychiatric classification adopted by 
the DSM. As will be discussed more extensively in the following section of this paper, since the 
publication of DSM-III in 1980, the DSM’s classification system has been distinguished by its 
purely descriptive, operationalist, and atheoretical approach. Murphy argues that a more 
promising approach to psychiatric classification would be a causal and theoretical approach, 
which is informed by sciences such as biology and the cognitive neurosciences. 
 Against the descriptive approach to psychiatric classification currently favored by the 
DSM, Murphy charges that this system of classification is incoherent, heterogeneous, and 
provincial. Murphy argues that the descriptive approach is incoherent in its application of the 
medical model. While the DSM assumes that mental disorders are distinct (disease) entities that 
reflect underlying differences among individuals, it prohibits reference to the causal processes 
and dysfunctions that distinguish them. As Murphy puts it, “the assumption that disorders can be 
classified by symptomatology alone requires us to assume that a significant difference can exist 
                                                            
6 Cooper articulates these arguments through a critical examination of the works of David Healy. See D. Healy The 
Antidepressant Era (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997); D. Healy, The Creation of 
Psychopharmacology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).   
7 Cooper, Classifying Madness, 127—132. 
8 For an extensive discussion of the inclusion of post-traumatic stress disorder in DSM-III, see A. Young, The 
Harmony of Illusions: Inventing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). 
5 
 
between two individuals at the level of surface symptoms that does not reflect an underlying 
causal difference”.9 With respect to heterogeneity, Murphy maintains that the DSM’s symptom-
based approach to classification fails to distinguish heterogeneous conditions. This stems from 
the fact that DSM categories can group together different symptom profiles as manifestations of 
the same disorder (when there are multiple ways to satisfy the diagnostic criteria for a disorder), 
and the same symptoms can be produced by different underlying causes. Finally, Murphy 
complains that the DSM is provincial insofar as its concepts and terms (e.g., ‘dissociation’, ‘self-
esteem’) are not coordinated with the sciences of the mind (e.g., the cognitive neurosciences). 
Without such engagement, the concepts and terms found in the DSM – which are often inherited 
from earlier historical traditions or folk psychology – are not subject to revision. Moreover, since 
mental disorders often involve dysfunctions that are studied extensively in the mind sciences, it 
is disadvantageous for the DSM to isolate itself from these bodies of research.   
 As a positive argument in favor of a causal approach to psychiatric classification, Murphy 
articulates an “exemplar” approach to classification, which is based on causal explanation. 
Murphy writes: 
I argue for classification by exemplar, in which a disorder is classified according to both 
its symptoms and the explanation of those symptoms at a variety of levels of explanation 
. . . . Exemplars are representations of symptoms and course, so strictly speaking it is not 
exemplars alone but explained exemplars that should make up a nosology. . . . My 
approach classifies representations, and sorts people into classes based on their 
resemblance to the exemplars.10 
The main difference between the DSM’s approach to classification and Murphy’s approach is 
that that the exemplar approach would supplement the descriptive categories of the DSM with 
causal information concerning the determinants of various symptoms. Exemplars include all the 
symptoms that arise from a particular (dysfunctional) causal process, which can help identify the 
proper boundaries of mental disorders. As Murphy puts it: “By articulating causal explanations . 
. . , the hope is that we will eventually be able [to] discriminate more finely among conditions 
that are currently lumped together by DSM’s fuzzy categories, by distinguishing syndromes on 
the basis of etiology and pathology”.11 In response to the objection that a causal system of 
taxonomy is difficult to achieve in practice due to lack of knowledge about etiology, Murphy 
emphasizes that a causal approach would point research in a fruitful direction. The immediate 
goal would be to identify disorders with distinct causes (causal discrimination), which would 
direct research towards finding out what those differences are; however, the long term goal 
would be to explain disorders by their distinct etiology (causal understanding). According to 
Murphy, even in the absence of mature causal theories, causal discrimination is an advance over 
clinical phenomenology insofar as it would orient research towards discovering what 
distinguishes different mental disorders (e.g., by developing specific tests, determining whether a 
disorder selectively responds to drug treatment). Ultimately, an exemplar approach could benefit 
clinical work insofar as clinicians could counter or prevent the normal outcome of pathological 
causal processes by using the causal histories associated with exemplars as a guide for 
intervention. 
                                                            
9 Murphy, Psychiatry in the Scientific Image, 324. 
10 Murphy, Psychiatry in the Scientific Image, 345. 




3. The History of the DSM’s Classification System 
A broader perspective for viewing Cooper’s and Murphy’s arguments can be achieved by 
considering relevant aspects of the history of the DSM. In the following section, I focus on 
psychiatry’s “revolution in classification” associated with the publication of DSM-III, wherein 
the psychoanalytic and etiological system of classification characteristic of DSM-I and DSM-II 
was replaced with an “atheoretical” and descriptive system. Two significant historical factors 
responsible for this shift were the inadequacy of psychoanalytic classificatory concepts to meet 
emerging practical social needs, and the “neo-Kraepelinian” DSM-III task force led by Robert 
Spitzer, who aimed to promote the empirical, medical, and biological aspects of psychiatry.  
 
3.1 The DSM’s Revolution in Classification 
DSM-I and DSM-II classified mental disorders in a broadly etiological manner, and they were 
theoretical manuals insofar as definitions and descriptions adopted in the manuals reflected key 
theoretical terms and distinctions of psychoanalytic psychiatry (most prominently, the 
psychoanalytic distinction between psychoses and neuroses).  
DSM-I was published in 1952 and included 106 disorders. A fundamental etiological 
classificatory distinction of DSM-I is a division between: (1) mental disorders caused by brain 
impairment, and (2) mental disorders of psychogenic origin.12 In DSM-I, these two major groups 
of mental disorders are described as follows: 
(1) those in which there is disturbance of mental function resulting from, or precipitated  
by, a primary impairment of the function of the brain, generally due to diffuse 
impairment of brain tissue; and 
(2) those which are the result of a more general difficulty in adaptation of the individual, 
and in which any associated brain function disturbance is secondary to the psychiatric 
disorder.13 
This division suggests a basic distinction between mental disorders with physical causes (i.e., 
brain damage) and mental disorders with psychological causes. In DSM-I, specific etiological 
factors are indicated in the name of all mental disorders caused by brain impairment (e.g., “acute 
brain syndrome due to metabolic disturbance”, “chronic brain syndrome due to intracranial neo-
plasm”, “chronic brain syndrome due to Mongolism”). By contrast, mental disorders of 
psychogenic origin (e.g., “psychotic disorders”, “psychoneurotic disorders”, “personality 
disorders”) only include a brief description and offer no indication of possible etiology.  
DSM-II was published in 1968 and included 182 disorders. Whereas DSM-I featured 
three major categories of mental disorders (see note 12), DSM-II organized mental disorders into 
                                                            
12 The exact terminology of DSM-I is “disorders caused by or associated with impairment of brain tissue function” 
(APA, DSM-I, 2) and “disorders of psychogenic origin without clearly defined physical cause or structural change in 
the brain” (APA, DSM-I, 5). Besides these two major categories, DSM-I also features the third major category of 
“mental deficiency” (what would subsequently be called “mental retardation”) of unknown cause. 
13 APA, DSM-I, 9.  
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ten major categories.14 Despite this organizational expansion, DSM-II preserved the DSM-I 
distinction between disorders of brain impairment (referred to as “organic brain syndromes” in 
DSM-II) and disorders of psychogenic origin (“functional disorders”).15 The major categories of 
mental disorders that indicate specific etiological factors in DSM-II are mental retardation (e.g., 
“mental retardation caused by chromosomal abnormality”) and organic brain syndromes (e.g., 
“psychosis associated with intracranial infection”). For the remaining eight major categories of 
mental disorders (see note 14), DSM-II only offers brief descriptions of the disorders without 
mentioning any specific causes, although these functional disorders are generally understood as 
disorders with psychological causes.  
 The publication of DSM-III marked a revolution in psychiatric classification due to its 
rejection of the theoretical (i.e., psychoanalytic) and etiological approach of its predecessors, and 
adoption of an atheoretical and descriptive approach. In the introduction of DSM-III, it is 
announced that: 
The approach taken in DSM-III is atheoretical with regard to etiology . . . except for 
those disorders for which this is well established . . . The major justification for the 
generally atheoretical approach . . . is that the inclusion of etiological theories would be 
an obstacle to use of the manual by clinicians of varying theoretical orientations . . . 
Because DSM-III is generally atheoretical with regard to etiology, it attempts to describe 
comprehensively what the manifestations of the mental disorders are, and only rarely 
attempts to account for how the disturbances come about . . . This approach can be said to 
be “descriptive” in that the definitions of the disorders generally consist of descriptions of 
the clinical features of the disorders. . . . at the lowest order of inference necessary to 
describe the characteristic features of the disorder.16  
The most significant innovation of DSM-III was the introduction of the now familiar “diagnostic 
criteria”, in which a diagnosis for a mental disorder can only be made if a set of necessary and 
sufficient criteria (typically observable or reportable symptoms) are satisfied. In addition to the 
introduction of diagnostic criteria in DSM-III, the major categories of mental disorder expanded 
to fifteen, while the total number of mental disorders listed increased to 265. Another prominent 
difference in DSM-III is that much of the psychoanalytic terminology of DSM-I and DSM-II was 
replaced with theoretically neutral language. While DSM-III does indicate etiological factors for 
a handful of disorders (mainly among the category of “organic mental disorders”), the key 
etiological distinction between disorders caused by brain impairment and disorders of 
psychogenic origin (or “functional disorders”) was removed. Thus, for the most part, DSM-III 
followed its promise of providing an atheoretical and descriptive approach to classification, 
which has remained the status quo in subsequent editions. 
 
                                                            
14 APA, DSM-II. The major categories in DSM-II are: (1) mental retardation, (2) organic brain syndromes, (3) 
psychoses not attributed to physical conditions, (4) neuroses, (5) personality disorders, (6) psychophysiologic 
disorders, (7) special symptoms, (8) transient situational disturbances, (9) behavioral disorders of childhood and 
adolescence, and (10) conditions without manifest psychiatric disorder and non-specific conditions. 
15 See APA, DSM-II, 123. For a summary of how DSM-I classifications map onto DSM-II classifications, see APA, 
DSM-II, 65—82, 125. 
16 APA, DSM-III, 7, emphasis in original. 
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3.2 The Marginalization of Psychoanalysis from 1960—1980   
The most important historical factors responsible for the DSM’s revolution in classification are 
related to the decline of psychoanalytically-oriented psychiatry in the United States, especially in 
the 1960s and 1970s.17 While psychoanalysis enjoyed a period of prestige in American from the 
post-war period to the early 1960s,18 after the 1960s, its scientific legitimacy was increasingly 
called into question. The 1960s featured prominent criticisms of psychiatry by “anti-
psychiatrists” such as Thomas Szasz and R. D. Laing,19 who questioned the scientific adequacy 
of concepts such as mental illness and mental health, as well as Michel Foucault, who suggested 
that the allegedly more humane medical conception of madness associated with modern 
psychiatry was merely another form of “moral confinement”.20 Psychiatry was also in the middle 
of several public embarrassments in the 1970s. In DSM-II, homosexuality was classified as a 
mental disorder,21 and gay rights organizations lobbied to have this classification removed. In 
1973, the APA boards of trustees decided – on apparently political, rather than scientific grounds 
– to remove the classification.22 It was also in 1973 when David Rosenhan published a highly 
publicized study,23 in which confederates feigning mental illness gained admission to mental 
hospitals across the United States, and were not recognized by hospital staff as normal, in spite 
of the fact that they acted normally after the initial interview. Moreover, psychoanalytically-
oriented psychiatry faced criticism from within psychiatry by disenchanted biologically-oriented 
psychiatrists who wished to narrow the scope of the field and raise psychiatry to the standards of 
acceptable science and medicine.24 
 The status of psychoanalytic psychiatry in the 1960s and 1970s was further marginalized 
by its inability to meet certain practical societal needs. In the two decades following 1960, there 
was a dramatic drop in the number of institutionalized psychiatric patients in state-run mental 
hospitals across the United States.25 A key reason for this widespread deinstitutionalization of 
patients was the introduction of chlorpromazine, an anti-psychotic drug used to treat psychosis 
(one of the main symptoms of schizophrenia). After the introduction of chlorpromazine in the 
                                                            
17 In this paper, I use the term “psychoanalysis” to refer to the psychodynamic and psychosocial psychiatric 
paradigm – associated with a historical lineage from Sigmund Freud to Adolf Meyer – that was dominant from 1945 
to 1975. For a more extensive discussion of this paradigm, see G. N. Grob, “Origins of DSM-I: A Study in 
Appearance and Reality”, American Journal of Psychiatry 148 (1991), 421—431; M. Wilson, “DSM-III and the 
Transformation of American Psychiatry: A History”, American Journal of Psychiatry 150 (1993), 399—410. 
18 See N. G. Hale, The Rise and Crisis of Psychoanalysis in America: Freud and the Americans, 1917-1985 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995); Grob, “Origins of DSM-I”. 
19 T. S. Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct (New York: Paul B. 
Hoeber, 1961); R. D. Laing, The Divided Self: An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness (London: Tavistock 
Publications, 1959).  
20 M. Foucault, Folie et Déraison: Histoire de la folie a l'âge classique (Paris: Plon, 1961). Foucault’s work was 
introduced to the United States by the significantly abridged English translation, Madness and Civilization: A 
History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, trans. R. Howard (New York: Pantheon, 1965). 
21 APA, DSM-II, 44. 
22 See R. Bayer, Homosexuality and American Psychiatry: The Politics of Diagnosis (New York: Basic Books, 
1981); R. Bayer and R. L. Spitzer, “Edited Correspondence on the Status of Homosexuality in DSM-III”, Journal of 
the History of the Behavioral Sciences 18 (1982), 32—52. 
23 D. Rosenhan, “On Being Sane in Insane Places”, Science 179 (1973), 250—258. 
24 See Wilson, “DSM-III and the Transformation”; R. Mayes and A. V. Horwitz, “DSM-III and the Revolution in 
the Classification of Mental Illness”, Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 41 (2005), 249—267. 
25 See G. N. Grob, From Asylum to Community: Mental Health Policy in Modern America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1991); G. N. Grob, “The Paradox of Deinstitutionalization”, Society 32 (1995), 51—59. 
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1950s, many institutionalized patients no longer needed to be confined to asylums, and were able 
to live in community settings. The increased deinstitutionalization and use of drugs to treat 
mental disorders (viz., psychosis, depression, anxiety, manic-depressive disorder) in the 1960s 
and 1970s highlighted the psychoanalytic paradigm’s inability to treat more serious psychiatric 
disorders.26 In the 1970s, psychoanalysis was also facing criticism from third-party medical 
insurance companies, who demanded clarity in psychiatric diagnoses and accountability for 
treatment outcomes.27 By the mid-1970s, insurance companies such as Blue-Cross and Aetna cut 
financial support for psychotherapy significantly, citing lack of clarity and uniformity of 
diagnoses for mental disorders, as well as lack of clinical accountability in the mental health care 
system.28 As such, the psychoanalytic diagnostic categories of DSM-II were failing to meet 
third-party insurance companies’ need for clear and standardized psychiatric diagnoses. 
In his well-known study of scientific revolutions, Thomas Kuhn suggested that 
conceptual revolutions are typically preceded by a stage of crisis, in which a paradigm’s inability 
to solve certain problems are recognized in the scientific community.29 This was certainly the 
case in the DSM’s revolution in classification, in which the inadequacies of psychoanalysis – 
from both an epistemic and pragmatic view – were recognized from both inside and outside of 
psychiatry by the mid-1970s. It was in this historical context that the APA task force responsible 
for revising DSM-II was able to transform the DSM from a psychoanalytic and etiological 
system of classification to an atheoretical and descriptive system. 
 
3.3  DSM-III: The Neo-Kraepelinian Response to Psychiatry’s Crisis  
In 1974, Robert L. Spitzer was appointed as the chairman for the APA Task Force on 
Nomenclature and Statistics, which was officially formed to coordinate DSM-III with the ninth 
edition of the World Health Organization’s International Classification of Diseases (ICD),30 and 
update the manual to reflect the current state of knowledge on mental disorders.31 In less than a 
decade, Spitzer and his like-minded task force reinvented the DSM in accordance with their 
“neo-Kraepelinian” outlook on psychiatric classification.32 The “neo-Kraepelinian” label was 
originally coined by George Klerman, who reported a Kraepelinian revival in psychiatry (led by 
                                                            
26 Mayes and Horwitz, “DSM-III and the Revolution”, 254—255. 
27 A. V. Horwitz, Creating Mental Illness (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), ch. 3. 
28 Wilson, “DSM-III and the Transformation”, 403.   
29 T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), chs. 7—
8. For discussion of American psychiatry’s revolution in classification in Kuhnian terms, see G. L. Klerman, 
“Paradigm Shifts in USA Psychiatric Epidemiology Since World War II”, Social Psychiatry 25 (1990), 27—32; 
Horwitz, Creating Mental Illness, ch. 3. 
30 WHO, Manual of the International Statistical Classification of Diseases, Injuries and Causes of Death (Geneva: 
World Health Organization, 1977). In this paper, I refer to this manual as ICD-9. 
31 APA, DSM-III, 1—2. 
32 Roger K. Blashfield, The Classification of Psychopathology: Neo-Kraepelinian and Quantitative Approaches 
(New York: Plenum Press, 1984) argues that Spitzer’s appointed task force formed an “invisible college” insofar as 
the group had close professional and social allegiances with one another, although these ties were not obvious to 
outsiders. Spitzer had especially close ties to a research group at Washington University in St. Louis who developed 
the influential “Feighner criteria”, a set of diagnostic criteria for fifteen mental disorders, which effectively served as 
a prototype for DSM-III diagnoses. See J. P. Feighner, E. Robins, S. B. Guze, R. A. Woodruff, G. Winokur, and R. 
Munoz, “Diagnostic Criteria for Use in Psychiatric Research”, Archives of General Psychiatry 26 (1972), 57—63. 
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Samuel Guze, Eli Robins, George Winokur, Donald Klein, and Robert Spitzer) accompanying 
the decline of Meyerian and Freudian psychoanalysis.33 This movement continued the tradition 
of psychiatry associated with Emil Kraepelin: the German psychiatrist who developed a 
biological approach to psychiatry in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century that was 
opposed to Freudian psychoanalysis.34 In the psychoanalytic paradigm, it was assumed that 
psychological mechanisms play a crucial role in the emergence of mental illness, and the 
boundary between normality and abnormality is continuous (ranging from neuroses of mild 
severity to psychoses of major severity).35 By contrast, the neo-Kraepelinians assumed that 
mental illnesses are discrete physical (biological) diseases, and there is a clear boundary between 
normality and the sick.36 Within this framework, it was crucial to distinguish the mentally ill 
from the well with reliable and valid diagnostic categories, which in psychoanalysis was 
secondary to the goal of elucidating the meaning of individuals’ observed symptoms.37 The 
desideratum for empirically validated diagnostic categories motivated the neo-Kraepelinian 
belief that mental disorders should be classified on the basis of their observable symptoms, as 
opposed to speculative inferences regarding their causes.38 These neo-Kraepelinian tenets formed 
the foundation for the task force’s shared conviction in the importance of descriptive diagnostic 
classifications.  
 The neo-Kraepelinian principles that guided the APA task force played a central role in 
influencing how the DSM would be revised, and the agenda of this task force clearly went 
beyond coordinating DSM-III with ICD-9. An excerpt from the minutes of the first meeting of 
the task force in 1974 (recorded by Spitzer) indicates that a revolution was already in the 
making: 
 It was the unanimous opinion of the Committee that etiology should be a classificatory  
principle only when it is clearly known . . . The diagnostic manual will be essentially  
behavioral, with exception for conditions of known etiology . . . . It was agreed that  
“functional” is no longer a suitable designation for a group of conditions – schizophrenias  
and affective disorders – which are no longer seen as purely psychogenic. It was further  
agreed that “psychosis” and “neurosis” are useful possibly as adjectives, but not as  
classificatory principles.39    
In 1975, after a preliminary version of DSM-III was drafted, which included significantly more 
diagnoses and more detailed descriptions of disorders than DSM-II, objections were raised by 
                                                            
33 G. L. Klerman, “The Evolution of Scientific Nosology” in J. C. Shershow (ed.), Schizophrenia: Science and 
Practice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), 99—121. Spitzer, “Letter to the Editor”, Schizophrenia 
Bulletin 8 (1982), 592, has insisted that he is not a “neo-Kraepelinian”, although he admits that his task force was 
made up of (self-identifying) neo-Kraepelinians. For discussion of how closely the APA task force followed 
Kraepelin’s principles, see H. S. Decker, “How Kraepelinian was Kraepelin? How Kraepelinian are the 
neo-Kraepelinians? – from Emil Kraepelin to DSM-III”, History of Psychiatry 18 (2007), 337—360. 
34 See Blashfield, Classification of Psychopathology, ch. 1.  
35 Wilson, “DSM-III and the Transformation”, 400—401. 
36 See Klerman, “The Evolution of Scientific Nosology”, 104—105. 
37 Wilson, “DSM-III and the Transformation”, 402. 
38 See Mayes and Horwitz, “DSM-III and the Revolution”, 259—261.  
39 Cited in Wilson, “DSM-III and the Transformation”, 405. 
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clinically-oriented (including psychoanalytic) psychiatrists who feared that DSM-III would be 
useful to researchers, but useless to clinicians.40 This led to the formation of a liaison committee 
(made up of clinically-oriented psychiatrists), and culminated in a controversy in 1979 centered 
on the task force’s attempted removal of the term “neurosis” as a classificatory principle.41 At 
this point, DSM-III was in its final stages and in danger of not being approved by the APA 
unless psychiatrists who wanted “neurosis” to be reinstated in the manual could be appeased.42 
This conflict stemmed from the fact that “[p]sychoanalytic practitioners feared that a change in 
psychiatric nomenclature might result in a challenge by third-party reimbursement sources 
seeking to limit payment to patients receiving long-term therapy”.43 The task force eventually 
compromised (and was able to publish DSM-III) by retaining the term “neurosis”, but qualifying 
that the term was only being used in a descriptive manner (rather than referring to an etiological 
process).44  
 DSM-III was largely successful in responding to the difficulties that psychoanalytic 
psychiatry faced in the 1960s and 1970s. Against accusations of pseudo-science, the neo-
Kraepelinian agenda of reorienting the DSM away from psychoanalysis and towards a 
biologically-oriented psychiatry alleviated some of these epistemic concerns by reaffirming the 
empirical, medical, and biological aspects of psychiatry.45 On a more specific level, DSM-III’s 
promise of reliable and valid psychiatric diagnoses, along with the assumption that mental 
disorders were a subset of physical illnesses (see note 57), was consonant with the emerging 
demands of prescribing pharmaceutical drugs,46 and met the medical insurance industry’s need to 
reimburse individuals who had genuine medical problems. With respect to the latter, during the 
DSM revision process, representatives from Blue Cross and Aetna were in contact with Spitzer’s 
task force, and encouraged them to standardize the manual’s diagnostic criteria so insurers could 
distinguish medical conditions from non-psychiatric problems.47 Several members of the task 
force have acknowledged that DSM-III’s structure was “strongly influenced by the need for 






40 Wilson, “DSM-III and the Transformation”, 405—407. 
41 See Mayes and Horwitz, “DSM-III and the Revolution”, 261—263. 
42 R. Bayer and R. L. Spitzer, “Neurosis, Psychodynamics, and DSM-III: A History of the Controversy”, Archives of 
General Psychiatry 42 (1985), 187—198. 
43 Bayer and Spitzer, “Neurosis, Psychodynamics, and DSM-III”, 192. 
44 APA, DSM-III, 9—10. 
45 Wilson, “DSM-III and the Transformation”, 408—409. 
46 Cooper, Classifying Madness, 112—118, argues that there is little historical evidence to support the idea that 
DSM-III was intentionally fashioned to facilitate research in pharmacology. However, the standardized diagnostic 
categories of DSM-III were undoubtedly regarded as useful tools for pharmaceutical treatment practices insofar as 
they could reliably diagnose more serious disorders such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. 
47 S. S. Sharfstein, “Third-Party Payments, Cost Containment, and DSM-III” in G. L. Tischler (ed.), Diagnosis and 
Classification in Psychiatry: A Critical Appraisal of DSM-III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 
530—538. Cooper, Classifying Madness, 132—134, suggests that although DSM-III was clearly shaped by the 
medical insurance industry, the APA and Spitzer’s task force denied this influence in public venues in order to 
uphold the scientific purity of DSM-III and, more generally, psychiatry.  




4. Lessons from the History of Psychiatry for Philosophers 
 
The history that surrounds the publication of DSM-III highlights the fact that psychiatry is an 
applied science that is focused on addressing a number of practical problems. Besides addressing 
purely epistemic problems concerning how to classify mental disorders, the DSM is a manual 
that simultaneously needed to address concrete practical problems (e.g., providing a manual that 
could facilitate mental health treatment). In the following section, I argue that evaluating a 
system of psychiatric classification should consider a system’s capacity to address practical 
problems (e.g., facilitating treatment goals) as well as epistemic ones (e.g., individuating mental 
disorders that are natural kinds), which is an issue that is often overlooked in philosophical 
analyses. From this perspective, I critically assess and expand upon the analyses advanced by 
Cooper and Murphy. I suggest that a consideration of the history of the DSM brings into 
question Cooper’s privileging of epistemic over practical values, and can reinforce Murphy’s 
advocacy of a causal system of psychiatric classification. 
 
 
4.1 The Pragmatic Aspects of Psychiatric Classification 
Psychiatry’s revolution in classification is a useful case study for indicating some ways in which 
Thomas Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions can be elaborated. In his analysis, Kuhn 
emphasized how successor paradigms are more effective at solving puzzles than prior 
paradigms.49 In responding to charges of relativism, Kuhn countered that: “[l]ater scientific 
theories are better than earlier ones for solving puzzles in often quite different environments. . . . 
That is not a relativist’s position, and it displays the sense in which I am a convinced believer in 
scientific progress”.50 Here, Kuhn presents “puzzle-solving efficacy” as a defensible criterion for 
judging “scientific progress”. For my purposes, I want to highlight the fact that Kuhn’s 
discussion of puzzle-solving is made in purely epistemic terms. In discussing the standards that 
are used to judge between competing paradigms, Kuhn consistently cited a number of values: (1) 
empirical accuracy, (2) internal and external consistency, (3) explanatory scope, (4) simplicity, 
and (5) fruitfulness for research.51 These values cited by Kuhn are purely epistemic insofar as 
they are assumed to promote good knowledge claims; however, Kuhn acknowledged that his list 
was not exhaustive and that “[o]ther sorts of values exist as well – for example, science should 
(or need not) be socially useful”.52 As illustrated by the DSM’s revolution in classification, non-
epistemic values (e.g., being useful for the medical insurance industry) can play a central role in 
determining which paradigms emerge as victors. This suggests that Kuhn’s notion of puzzle-
solving need not be limited to epistemic problems, and can extend to practical problems.  
Besides being a historical factor in determining which paradigms survive, I want to 
suggest that in some fields of science – especially in applied fields of science, such as psychiatry 
– the capacity of a paradigm to solve practical problems is an important value to consider in 
                                                            
49 Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions, ch. 13. 
50 Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 206. 
51 Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 184—185; T. S. Kuhn, “Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory 
Choice” in T. S. Kuhn, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1977), 320—329; T. S. Kuhn, “Rationality and Theory Choice”, Journal of Philosophy 
80 (1983), 563—570.  
52 Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 185, emphasis added. 
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evaluating the relative merits of competing theoretical frameworks.53 Given that the benefits of 
applied sciences (e.g., medicine, engineering) arise primarily from the success of their concrete 
applications, it is reasonable to evaluate the relative merits of competing theoretical systems in 
these domains in terms of the ability of a paradigm to solve practical problems.54 From this 
perspective, the historical fact that practical considerations played a crucial role in the evolution 
of the DSM provides support for the philosophical argument that theoretical frameworks in the 
applied sciences should be evaluated on pragmatic grounds.55 
In this connection, I submit that the neo-Kraepelinian classification system of DSM-III 
was superior to the psychoanalytic and etiological system it replaced insofar as it was a more 
useful manual for addressing practical problems. In particular, a key practical problem that the 
psychoanalytic paradigm was unable to solve, and the neo-Kraepelinian paradigm was able 
solve, was the provision of a system of classification that could accommodate the needs of the 
medical insurance industry (i.e., by providing clear and reliable diagnoses). Furthermore, I would 
suggest that DSM-III implicitly assumed a value-orientation that weighed practical goals more 
heavily than DSM-I and DSM-II insofar as the authors of DSM-III attempted to provide a 
diagnostic manual that could be used by researchers of different theoretical orientations, 
encourage the study of mental disorders in a standardized fashion, and provide reliable diagnoses 
for purposes of treatment.  
 
4.2 Classifying Natural Kinds vs. Promoting Practical Goals  
Cooper argues that the DSM’s goal of classifying mental disorders as natural kinds is unlikely to 
be realized because of external influences on the manual (e.g., the medical insurance industry). 
While Cooper reaches this conclusion through a close engagement with the history surrounding 
the publication of DSM-III,56 and her discussion of specific undesirable influences on the DSM 
is unobjectionable, her analysis fails to sufficiently acknowledge the inherently practical 
elements of psychiatric classification. What the history of the DSM illustrates is the importance 
of non-epistemic goals in psychiatry. In what follows, I argue that Cooper’s philosophical 
analysis places too much weight on epistemic goals at the expense of practical goals in its 
                                                            
53 I assume that pure science concerns describing how the world is, whereas applied science concerns changing the 
world. This understanding of the pure and applied science distinction is defended by M. Bunge, “Technology as 
Applied Science”, Technology and Culture 7 (1966), 329—349. Philosophers of science who have emphasized the 
importance of practical and social dimensions of scientific knowledge include Helen Longino and Ronald Giere. See 
H. E. Longino, The Fate of Knowledge (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); R. N. Giere, Scientific 
Perspectivism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006). 
54 For a more comprehensive discussion of this issue with reference to specific instances of applied science, see K. 
Shrader-Frechette, “Hydrogeology and Framing Questions Having Policy Consequences”, Philosophy of Science 64 
(1997), S149—S160; M. Carrier, “Knowledge and Control: On the Bearing of Epistemic Values in Applied 
Science” in P. Machamer and G. Wolters (eds.), Science, Values, and Objectivity (Pittsburgh, PA: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2004), 275—293; I. de Melo Martín and K. Intemann, “Can Ethical Reasoning Contribute to Better 
Epidemiology? A Case Study in Research on Racial Health Disparities”, European Journal of Epidemiology 22 
(2007), 215—221. 
55 This stance follows the Kuhnnian view that descriptive generalizations from the history of science can sometimes 
serve as evidence for philosophical prescriptions concerning what constitutes good scientific practice. See T. S. 
Kuhn, “Reflection on My Critics” in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 237; Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 207—208. 
56 Cooper, Classifying Madness, 127—138.  
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implicit assumptions that: (1) the primary aim of the DSM is to classify natural kinds, and (2) it 
is always undesirable for this aim to be constrained by non-epistemic factors. 
 While there is some credibility to Cooper’s assumption that the main goal of the DSM is 
to classify natural kinds, her analysis obscures other goals of the manual. The authors of the 
DSM have never discussed mental disorders in the language of “natural kinds”; however, a 
guiding assumption of the DSM-III task force was the Kraepelian assumption that “mental 
disorders are a subset of medical conditions”.57 This indicates that an implicit aim of DSM-III 
was to classify mental disorders that are naturally occurring medical conditions (i.e., natural 
kinds), as opposed to various forms of deviance that might have a social or cultural basis (i.e., 
artificial kinds). Although classifying natural kinds is an implicit goal of the DSM, it is clear that 
it aims to achieve other goals. One of the clearest and most explicit statements of the DSM’s 
goals is stated in DSM-IV-TR as follows: “The purpose of DSM-IV is to provide clear 
descriptions of diagnostic categories in order to enable clinicians and investigators to diagnose, 
communicate about, study, and treat people with various mental disorders”.58 In this passage, 
and the section discussing DSM-IV’s definition of mental disorder,59 there is no indication that 
the DSM primarily aims to classify naturally occurring disorders.60 It is also notable that 
facilitating the treatment of individuals with mental disorders, which is a practical and non-
epistemic goal, is explicitly cited by the authors of DSM-IV as a goal. 
 Questions concerning the actual aims of the DSM may be a red-herring given that – as 
Cooper correctly notes in her analysis – the DSM’s public image does not always square with its 
authors’ intentions.61 However, I want to more decisively challenge Cooper’s implicit 
assumption that the DSM ought to classify natural kinds, and that non-epistemic influences that 
detract from this goal are necessarily undesirable. As the history of the DSM-III revision process 
illustrates, considerations involved in revising the DSM’s system of classification (e.g., meeting 
the emerging demands of the medical insurance industry) were not limited to creating a coherent 
epistemic taxonomic system. Cooper regards the influence of these non-epistemic forces as 
negative, but is this necessarily the case? To take one of Cooper’s examples, suppose that 
pharmaceutical industry creates pressures to lump together disorders (e.g., as “affective spectrum 
disorders”) that respond to similar treatments.62 While this phenomenon may detract from the 
                                                            
57 See R. L. Spitzer, M. Sheehy and J. Endicott, “DSM-III: Guiding Principles” in V. M. Rakoff, H.  C. Stancer, and 
H. B. Kedward (eds.), Psychiatric Diagnosis (New York: Brunner/ Mazel, 1977), 1—24; R. L. Spitzer and J. 
Endicott, “Medical and Mental Disorder: Proposed Definition and Criteria” in R. L. Spitzer and D. F. Klein (eds.), 
Critical Issues in Psychiatric Diagnosis (New York: Raven Press, 1978), 15—39. The APA task force initially 
planned to include the statement that “mental disorders are a subset of medical conditions” in the introduction of 
DSM-III; however, this plan was voted against since psychologists, social workers, and counselors regarded it as a 
declaration that psychiatrists (with medical training) were solely responsible for the treatment of mental disorders. 
See Mayes and Horwitz, “DSM-III and the Revolution”, 260—261.  
58 APA, DSM-IV-TR, xxxvii, emphasis added. 
59 APA, DSM-IV-TR, xxx—xxxi. 
60 Moreover, in discussing limitations of the categorical approach, the authors of DSM-IV-TR, xxxi, explicitly 
eschew the idea that they are classifying natural kinds in Cooper’s sense: 
 In DSM-IV, there is no assumption that each category of mental disorder is a completely discrete entity  
with absolute boundaries dividing it from other mental disorders or from no mental disorder. There is also 
no assumption that all individuals described as having the same mental disorder are alike in all important 
ways.  
61 Cooper, Classifying Madness, 132—133. 
62 Cooper, Classifying Madness, 124—125. 
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goal of distinguishing natural kinds, it may promote the treatment of individuals (i.e., by 
distinguishing disorders on the basis of successful interventions). As indicated in DSM-IV, one 
goal of the DSM – besides promoting epistemic research goals – is to facilitate treatment goals. I 
believe that this is a perfectly defensible goal for evaluating the DSM. As argued above, there are 
compelling reasons for evaluating theoretical systems in applied sciences, such as systems of 
psychiatric classification, on practical grounds (e.g., the capacity of a system to facilitate 
treatment goals). Hence, I reject Cooper’s implicit assumption that epistemic goals (i.e., 
classifying mental disorders as natural kinds) should be weighted more heavily than practical 
goals (e.g., providing a manual that facilitates treatment and clinical intervention). The history of 
the DSM demonstrates that non-epistemic influences are often ubiquitous and inevitable, as 
opposed to factors that can (or need to) be removed or minimized. 
 
4.3 The Historicity of Psychiatric Classification  
The historical and practical aspects of psychiatric classification emphasized in this paper can 
serve to strengthen Murphy’s general advocacy of a causal system of classification. One insight 
that can be gained from looking at the history of the DSM is that the move to a descriptive 
system of classification in DSM-III was largely due to contingent historical factors (viz., the 
theoretical inadequacy of DSM-I and DSM-II, and the inability of DSM-II to meet certain social 
needs) specific to the 1960s and 1970s. This suggests that there is no absolute and ahistorical 
ideal of psychiatric classification that will be appropriate for all historical periods. While the 
descriptive system of classification introduced in DSM-III may have been an improvement over 
DSM-II, it does not need to be regarded as an end-point. 
 The historical nature of psychiatric taxonomic systems was a fact that was fully 
appreciated by the philosopher of science, Carl Hempel.63 According to Hempel, the 
development of a taxonomic system is a historical process, which must begin with a descriptive 
stage before progressing to a theoretical stage. He writes: 
[T]he development of a scientific discipline may often be said to proceed from an initial 
. . . stage, which primarily seeks to describe the phenomena under study . . . to subsequent  
more and more ‘theoretical’ stages, in which increasing emphasis is placed upon the  
attainment of comprehensive theoretical accounts. . . . In medical science, the  
development from a predominantly descriptive to an increasingly theoretical emphasis is  
reflected . . . in the transition from a largely symptomatological to a more and more  
etiological point of view.64     
In its descriptive stage, Hempel recommends the use of empirically-defined operational 
concepts, and he remarks that the psychoanalytic classificatory concepts of DSM-I are 
problematic insofar as they “lack clear and uniform criteria of application”.65 While Hempel 
                                                            
63 C. G. Hempel, “Fundamentals of Taxonomy” in C. G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other 
Essays in the Philosophy of Science (New York: The Free Press, 1965), 137—154. Hempel’s analysis is particularly 
interesting as it was originally written in 1959, located historically between the publications of DSM-I (1952) and 
DSM-II (1968), and prior to the DSM’s descriptive turn. 
64 Hempel, “Fundamentals of Taxonomy”, 140. 
65 Hempel, “Fundamentals of Taxonomy”, 141. 
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would have approved of the diagnostic criteria introduced in DSM-III, his analysis suggests that 
to achieve a truly scientific status, a system of classification cannot remain content in its 
descriptive stages, but must advance to theoretical stages. For Hempel, mature taxonomic 
systems should organize subclasses by theoretical principles, which provide a basis for 
explanation and prediction,66 and he cites examples from chemistry and biology in support of 
this stance.67 From this Hempelian standpoint, a theoretical and causal system of classification 
such as Murphy’s exemplar approach would be the next logical stage to supplant the descriptive 
system of classification currently employed in the DSM.68 
 The history of psychiatry illustrates that the DSM’s descriptive system of classification 
was appropriate in the historical context of the late-1970s, when the psychoanalytic diagnostic 
categories of DSM-II were failing to meet the emerging need for clear and reliable diagnostic 
categories. In the context of current mental health practices, however, the historical factors that 
motivated the atheoretical and descriptive approach (i.e., removing questionable psychoanalytic 
assumptions, avoiding excessive speculation about etiology, providing reliable diagnostic 
categories) are no longer relevant. From this standpoint, there are no longer strong reasons for 
not supplementing the descriptive diagnostic categories of the DSM with causal information. As 
Murphy points out, the prohibition against theoretical and causal information has functioned – in 
contemporary practices – to isolate the DSM from large bodies of scientific research on 
psychopathology, which could provide crucial theoretical resources for discriminating distinct 
disorders (i.e., by etiology). Moreover, a theoretical and causal basis for psychiatric classification 
– in its capacity to provide explanatory and predictive classificatory concepts – could provide a 
more robust basis for testing and revising diagnostic categories in the DSM.  
Like Cooper’s analysis, Murphy’s argument tends to emphasize epistemic goals, and 
downplay the importance of practical goals. However, the practical aspects of the DSM can also 
support Murphy’s argument for a causal system of classification. As mentioned previously, the 
DSM explicitly cites the facilitation of treatment as an important pragmatic function of the 
DSM.69 In this connection, causal information about mental disorders could provide useful 
guidance for successfully treating individuals with mental disorders. A causal system could 
incorporate treatment goals by grouping together disorders that involve similar causal factors 
(e.g., similar neurotransmitter dysfunction) or disorders that respond positively to similar 
treatments (e.g., cognitive-behavioral therapy).70 With respect to the argument that “inclusion of 
etiological theories would be an obstacle to use of the manual by clinicians of varying theoretical 
                                                            
66 Hempel, “Fundamentals of Taxonomy”, 146—151. In this connection, Hempel, praises DSM-I for its adoption of 
an “etiological or generally theoretical account”, 149. 
67 Hempel, “Fundamentals of Taxonomy”, 147—148. Hempel remarks that the modern periodic table of elements is 
organized by theoretical principles such that the subclasses of the table (e.g., the vertical columns or “groups”) 
reflect properties in the atomic structure of the elements. He also points out that while early biological taxonomic 
systems were purely descriptive insofar as its subclasses were determined exclusively by morphological 
characteristics – with the advent of the theory of evolution – this morphological basis was replaced by a 
classification system with a stronger theoretical (i.e., phylogenetic) basis. 
68 Murphy, Psychiatry in the Scientific Image, 220—221, recognizes the relevance and importance of Hempel’s 
essay for his own argument for causal classification. 
69 APA, DSM-IV-TR, xxxvii.  
70 Hempel, “Fundamentals of Taxonomy”, 149—150, discusses the possibility of including prognostic prospects and 
therapeutic possibilities among the defining characteristics of mental disorders. 
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orientations”,71 I agree with Murphy’s contention that a move towards causal classification 
would still represent an advance over purely descriptive classifications insofar as it would 
provide a systematic basis for revising diagnostic categories and suggesting fruitful lines of 
research. At present, the DSM’s descriptive system provides no clear guidelines for deciding 
when a disorder should be retained, revised, or removed from the manual. By contrast, in a 
causal system such as Murphy’s exemplar approach, possession of a distinctive biological 
etiology (even if that etiology is currently unknown) could serve as a relatively clear heuristic for 
determining when a disorder should be included or not. With respect to the theoretical basis for 
such a system, I would suggest that the only tenable theoretical basis for a causal system of 
classification would be a pluralistic one, constituted by the best current theories (e.g., in 
neuroscience, molecular biology, the behavioral sciences), and always subject to revision. 
The argument for a causal approach to psychiatric classification is particularly relevant 
for proposed changes in DSM-V (which is scheduled to be published in 2013). Members of the 
DSM-V task force (chaired by David J. Kupfer) have explicitly stated their intention to move the 
classification system of the DSM away from the descriptive “neo-Kraepelinian diagnostic 
paradigm” adopted in DSM-III towards a more theoretical approach.72 One of the explicit 
motivations for such a shift – consonant with the arguments above concerning the fallibility and 
revisability of diagnostic categories – is to provide a system of classification that would 
“facilitate ongoing testing of the diagnostic criteria that are intended to be scientific 
hypotheses”.73 While DSM-V will not include causal information about mental disorders (the 
main difference between DSM-IV and DSM-V will be more prominent use of dimensional 
measures), members of the DSM-V task force have anticipated such a possibility.74 The analysis 




In this paper, I critically examined Cooper’s and Murphy’s analyses of psychiatric classification 
by considering relevant aspects of the history of psychiatry. With respect to Cooper’s analysis, I 
argued that the goal of classifying disorders as natural kinds was not – and should not be – the 
exclusive goal of psychiatric classification. Besides meeting epistemic goals, a classification 
manual like the DSM should be oriented towards achieving certain practical goals (e.g., the 
provision of a manual that promotes treatment), and I suggested that practical goals of 
psychiatric classification should sometimes be weighted more heavily than epistemic ones. With 
respect to Murphy’s analysis, I argued that his call for a causal and theoretical system of 
classification is strengthened by a historical outlook on psychiatric classification. Unless one 
assumes a naïve and ahistorical view of psychiatric classification, the DSM’s atheoretical and 
descriptive approach cannot be seriously regarded as an adequate end-point for psychiatric 
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72 See D. J. Kupfer, M. B. First, and D. A. Regier, “Introduction” in D. J. Kupfer, M. B. First, and D. A. Regier, A 
Research Agenda for DSM-V (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, 2002), xviii—xix. 
73 D. A. Regier, W. E. Narrow, E. A. Kuhl, and D. J. Kupfer, “The Conceptual Development of DSM-V”, American 
Journal of Psychiatry 166 (2009), 648—649, emphasis added.  
74 See S. E. Hyman, “Can Neuroscience be Integrated into the DSM-V?”, Nature Reviews Neuroscience 8 (2007), 
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classification. While DSM-III was certainly an advance in its historical context given the 
inadequacies of DSM-II, a shift to a theoretical and causal approach has strong potential – in the 
current historical context – to mark a further step of progress, from both an epistemic and 
pragmatic perspective. 
 A more general aim of the analysis of this paper was to illustrate the benefits of history 
for philosophy of psychiatry, and the virtues of historically-informed approaches to philosophy 
of science. Given the complex nature of psychiatric classification – which involves a mixture of 
epistemic and pragmatic considerations – a promising approach for addressing philosophical 
questions regarding classification is to examine the actual historical factors that led psychiatrists 
to adopt their current ideals of classification. The chief merit of this approach is that it can 
account for psychiatrists’ own reasoning regarding issues of classification, while simultaneously 
considering the actual constraints that psychiatrists faced in addressing questions of how mental 
disorders should be classified. In this manner, a historical approach is capable of engaging with 
psychiatric practices and speaking to concerns that have been historically important in debates 
concerning the classification of mental disorders. In illustrating how an examination of the 
history of the DSM can qualify and expand upon existing philosophical analyses of psychiatric 
classification, I hope to have demonstrated the valuable methodological role that history can play 
in complementing philosophy of science analyses.75 
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